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Towards a Phenomenology of Objects:
Husserl and the Life-World
Peter R. Costello
In this paper, I explore Edmund Husserl’s account of the life-world for
evidence that he posits it as the living flesh of the transcendental ego and
thus as our primordial object-relation. In so doing, I attempt to rehabili-
tate and defend Husserl’s notion of transcendental subjectivity, of the a
priori, by noting how one’s embodiment in many concrete experiences
calls for and bears witness to this transcendental foundation of
itself. After developing my reading of Husserl’s account of the life-
world, I then turn to the phenomenological psychology of John Russon
in his book Human Experience to show how Husserl’s life-world as the pri-
mordial object-relation opens us onto a very concrete vision of intersub-
jectivity.
The long-term trade in truth no longer
involves  thought: strangely  enough, it
now seems to involve things. 
Jacques Lacan speaking as Truth1
Introduction
I n this paper I will argue that for transcendental phenomenology the“long-term trade in truth” indeed “involves things” and that meaning assuch can only appear as that which is generated by a transcendental,
fleshly subject in an original intertwining with its own original “Thing,” its
life-world (Lebenswelt).2 To make this claim about the relevance of the tran-
27
1. “The Freudian Thing” 115.
2. This insight has been already noted by Sartre: “As such, the body is not distinct from 
scendental ego and of its unity with its original object, its life-world, I will
examine Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology. In this work, Husserl makes a particular claim that the life-
world appears as living, as a kind of organic whole. This claim, coupled
with Husserl’s general discussion of the life-world as embracing both the
pre-scientific and the various sedimentary layers of the senses of conscious-
ness and its objects, could suggest that Husserl holds such a view on the re-
lationship between the transcendental ego and the life-world, one that is
largely different from the one usually attributed to him. 
As I read him, Husserl argues that the transcendental ego constitutes the
life-world as the changing, developing, and expanding way in which the ob-
jects of experience can call out to and intertwine with the ego, can draw the
ego into a mood, and can even serve as the ego’s memorial cells. And to con-
stitute the life-world as the way objects matter is to constitute it in an anal-
ogous manner to the lived body, since the lived body too appears as the very
way in which particular objects come to hold meaning for consciousness, as
graspable or visible and to what extent they appear as such. However, if
Husserl is indeed arguing that the life-world is the flesh of the transcenden-
tal ego, is analogous to the lived body, then this would allow transcendental
phenomenology not only to show that truth “involves things” but also, more
importantly, to offer an intriguing account of truth’s back and forth move-
ment between subject and object, of how things can (and do) think them-
selves into me as much as I think about (and think myself into) them.
The General Argument - Life-World and Intersubjectivity
Now of course one of the first challenges to portraying the transcendental
ego as having any kind of a priori flesh is Husserl’s description of ego-hood
as such. Husserl states clearly in Crisis that “being an ego through the living
body is of course not the only way of being an ego” (108). However, given
that “none of its ways can be severed from the others” (108), I believe there
is still room for a discussion of the transcendental ego, which is presumably
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the situation of the for-itself, since for the for-itself to exist and to be situated are one
and the same; on the other hand, the body is identified with the whole world inas-
much as the world is the total situation of the for-itself and the measure of its exis-
tence” (408-9, my emphasis). However, I want to claim that the recognition of the
logical notions of situation, of for-itself, and of world is possible only insofar as the
transcendental ego is necessary and only insofar as its world is a more bodily and a
priori notion than Sartre would admit.
the most salient additional “way of being an ego,” as having something like
a body. 
Husserl must be correct when he claims that the ego does not merely act
through its Leib. After all, the experience of one’s own living body, like all
experience, could show up only against some background. That this back-
ground is there is evident in that my body makes sense to me, even as it ex-
pands and constricts in its acquisition and loss of habits and capacities. 
Merleau-Ponty gives a salient example of a blind person learning to use
a stick.3 The body incorporates things into itself, and I feel the world there,
at the edge of the stick, and no longer simply in my hand. How is such an
ongoing, coherent experience of bodily expansion possible? How is the ex-
pansion (and constriction) of bodily experience something I make sense of?
It is possible only if the acquisition and loss of habits are not entirely sur-
prises, only if a priori my subjectivity placed its body within a larger or
higher reference of ownership. 
But how does this “higher” point of reference function? And, if it func-
tions as a location of subjectivity outside of the lived body, then how can the
subjectivity with this “higher reference” constitute or connect with its particu-
lar, lived body? How does the transcendental ego come to be able to recognize
this lived body as its lived experience of consciousness, as its own “animate or-
ganism [that is] uniquely singled out” (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 97)? 
The Husserlian phenomenologist can answer this last question in par-
ticular only insofar as she experiences evidence of an analogy4 between life-
world and lived body. That is, insofar as the conditions and structures for
the experience of her own body are themselves experienced and themselves
“kin” to embodiment, the phenomenologist can simultaneously be united
with her body and gain the necessary “distance” needed to constitute it. 
Let me develop an example: my experience of my lived body is that of
a pre-scientific unity of life that nevertheless allows me to incorporate sci-
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3. See Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: “The blind man’s stick has
ceased to be an object for him and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has be-
come an area of sensitivity” (165).
4. Some evidence of Husserl’s own recognition of this parallel between lived body and
transcendental flesh comes in the second book of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenom-
enology. One exemplary passage reads as follows: “the structure of the acts which ra-
diate out from the Ego-Center or the Ego itself, is a form which has an analagon in
the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in reference to the Body. In absolute con-
sciousness there is always a ‘field’ of intentionality, and the spiritual ‘focus’ of the at-
tention ‘directs’ itself now onto this, now onto that” (112, my emphasis).
entific habits of self-reflection into my very experience of myself. As I grow
up, I learn not to fear the doctor and not to feel too comfortable in my body
but to develop an internal “searchlight” for disease and to go to her every
time I feel a certain way. How could this experience of progressively sens-
ing my embodiment according to the perspective of science be achieved?
How can I incorporate a facet of the life-world into my own life? 
This experience, this incorporation, could be achieved only if the entire
life-world itself were already lived by (my) transcendental ego as both the
condition for and the product of my lived bodily experience. And, accord-
ing to Husserl, this is just the way that the life-world does appear. On the
one hand, the life-world appears as the transcendental ego’s object-like hori-
zon, as the guarantee that any particular object-relation will have a back-
ground on which to appear. As this condition and horizon, the life-world ap-
pears as pre-scientific, immediately simple and unitary. On the other hand,
the life-world appears as ongoing activity, that of receiving lived bodily ex-
perience and of guiding the body’s ongoing object-discovery. As this recep-
tion and guidance, the life-world appears as sedimentary, mediately multi-
ple, and as referring backwards and forwards towards an overarching, syn-
thetic whole that is only a priori by continually concretizing new meanings
out of its relation with lived bodily perception. 
But if I experience the life-world as not only the condition but also the
reception and guidance of lived bodily activity, then I experience a connec-
tion between the two. My body too is a condition for perceptual and kines-
thetic experience. And my body too receives and guides these experiences
into habits, memories, anticipations, and capacities. The body, it would
seem, is a microcosm of the life-world. Or, to put it another way, my lived
body, like a smaller Russian doll, nests within the life-world. 
The life-world and my body, then, are both given a priori as the same
kind of whole - a whole that only become more explicit in its wholeness
through incorporating my ways of living them. However, this connection,
their nesting, their similarity as wholes, would not be experienced as such
without the recognition of other subjects and other bodies. It is not in the
body itself that I see the connection between my body and its life-world. It
is, rather, in the effects that others have on my body that the life-world opens
up as relevant, as connected. It is as a body that is challenged, affirmed, and
experienced by others that I recognize that my body nests within a flesh that
surpasses it.
Let us return to the example of being in the doctor’s office. Under her
watchful eyes, within a society’s medical and pharmaceutical gazes, I feel
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my body alter, expand, or take on a new power. What is this expansion, this
power? It is the ability of my body to become intersubjective, intercorpore-
al in a particular way. It is the ability of my body to take on more than one
perspective at a time, to overlay perspectives onto one another, and to e-
merge as a newly constituting human being who bears a new relationship to
what is pre-scientifically his. 
This self-constitution as an internal searchlight is the experience of an
increase in my experience of world. But this experience of increase is not
merely an experience of quantity growing larger but an experience of the ex-
pansion of the very qualities of ownership and involvement. The others have
not just been experienced as indifferent to my body and my world. They
have been incorporated as the very intertwining of body and world. It is the
others who have given me the occasion and necessity for seeing the life-
world as the background on which my lived body relies. It is the others who
make it necessary to turn towards the life-world for further guidance in my
appropriations. 
One might say my lived body “opens up,” becomes “shaken” and be-
comes “familiar again” through my experience of relating with others and
relating, through them, to the life-world. As I “settle with” the doctor’s new
and medically sensitive gaze, I pass into a more sophisticated recognition of
the relations that have always already been passively guiding my sense of
my body. At the same time it (this medical layer of the life-world and all of
its correlates) becomes embodied in my own gaze and receives a concretion
that cannot but affect its ongoing presence as such a layer. The life-world
does not remain unchanged by my incorporation of its medical layer through
my dealings with the doctor. Its ongoing coherence can be altered by my
particular explication, by what I do with it.
In fact, it is this experience of the world being opened up and incorpo-
rated successfully and specifically (I may, for example, discover and articu-
late for the first time a political insidiousness that operates in Western med-
icine) which points to the life-world as being my own flesh. It is the en-
counter in the doctor’s office, in the imbibing of television commercials for
pharmaceuticals over and over again, that sustains, motivates, and impedes
me as I pass into and through the relationships I discover with others. 
In sum, the experience in which I engage the doctor is really a salient
moment within the ongoing experience of the overlaying of the life-world
and my own self-experience. Only if my point of view on my body was al-
ways already able to become the perspective of the doctor or of science as
such, only if I equally claimed all objects and perspectives as my own fa-
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miliar flesh, could I begin to feel myself immediately and empirically in
those ways. 
Life-World as Alive
According to Husserl, the life-world is what one has as “einer geistigen
Gestalt” (Gesammelte Schriften Band 8 115),5 as a style or as “the unity of
a living organism” (“eines lebendigen Organismus”) (Crisis 113; Krisis
116). To the question of whether the description of a life-world truly (and
not simply metaphorically) appears as a Gestalt or an Organismus, I believe
Husserl to have answered in the affirmative. 
First and foremost, the life-world must appear as alive in order for the
transcendental ego to constitute itself as alive. For in order to experience it-
self as alive, the transcendental ego needs to constitute itself as having a his-
tory, as having been the same whole that now had its hand as an organ and
now as an object. But without the life-world itself appearing as historical,
as organic, the correlates or acts or layers of sense that the transcendental
ego entrusts to that world would be preserved without any internal organi-
zation, without the character of historicity as such, and thus the transcen-
dental ego could not itself retrieve those historical acts or even encounter
itself as historical. 
That the life-world does appear as historical, as the very ability of
things to retain their references to life and historicality, is shown in that one
can accidentally dig up any archaeological site and immediately experience
the objects found as historical. Any experience “in the world” hearkens
back to the life-world; any experience of the life-world must be that of or-
ganicity. 
In addition, to argue that flesh has no place in the ultimate self-
constitution of the transcendental ego is to take away, as I have argued
above, the means by which one could understand how that transcendental
ego could become objectified in particular human subjects. And to do that,
to take away the comprehensibility of the relation between the transcenden-
tal ego and the particular humans who claim it as their own is to commit
Kant’s error; i.e. it is to “distinguish this transcendental subjectivity from the
soul” (Husserl, Crisis 118) in such a way as to leave philosophy for myth.
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5 All further references to the original German of this text, since it has been coupled
with the Cartesianische Meditationen in the collected works in German, will be
cited as Krisis in the text.
In order to prove the transcendental ego has its flesh, then, I will show
how the only candidate for its flesh, the life-world, is more than metaphor-
ically alive. For the transcendental ego to constitute or recognize the life-
world is to recognize that the life-world is pre-given as the foundation of
all objective meaning, yet, as pre-given, it nevertheless builds itself up
anew as the particular experiences of world, as “objective” truths that mul-
tiply in order to return us to a shared experience. The life-world is some-
thing that means to us a kind of agency; we experience it as “pulling” “all
of science . . . along with us” into itself (130-31). It builds itself; it pulls
us - the experience of the agency of the life-world suggests that it is ex-
perienced as alive.
The life-world’s organic agency, in fact, and its ability to both ground
our activities and contain them, is what allows us to be alive qua objectified
or qua human subject. Much as we are aware of only one of our organs or
limbs at a time in conscious focus, we are also aware of only one of our vo-
cations, one of our life-projects at a time. The life-world is the flesh that
preserves the other projects of our embodied subjectivity that we deposit
there for the time being. The life-world is the flesh that we “entrust” with
our own as human beings.
Indeed, we have a body as a whole only insofar as we (the human, nat-
ural egos) cede full rights to its constitution, only insofar as our body is al-
so constituted in relationships, in families, in cultures, in a world and in a u-
niversal subjectivity that entwines itself in us. We take on projects and push
others into the background only insofar as we already claim that our own
flesh is a much more complex affair than what is immediately apparent. 
To write a paper now is to foreground one project with the co-experience
of having faith that the other projects I also care about do not thereby die but
remain secure. My friends will still call me, my wife will walk back to the
room a few hours from now, etc. - these concerns or projects do not appear
to be in danger of being erased solely by my sitting down to work. To act
with the whole of my subjectivity in one particular way is implicitly to
acknowledge the way the world maintains the other directions of my con-
stitutive acts, just as the body maintains my eyes when I am focusing on lis-
tening to the music in my headphones, etc. 
To turn our attention, as Husserl suggests, to the life-world as such a
guardian of our own constitution is to gain a further insight into the very
process of correlation between things and our syntheses. The life-world is
the confluence of things and syntheses that stand “in an inseparable syn-
thetic totality which is constantly produced by intentionally overlapping
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[übergreifende] horizon-validities; and the latter influence each other recip-
rocally” (145). To constitute the life-world, then, is to constitute the whole
of ourselves-with-things; to constitute the life-world is to see, perhaps for
the first time, the life of the whole in which we are implicated. 
Just as an organism is a unity of its own organs and systems, members
and acts, so too is the life-world. It is not a “totality,” if by that word one
means an adequately grasped and closed set of meanings. However, it is a
whole, given as such just as our body is, not as simply an ideal object, not
as simply any kind of object. Recognizing the whole of the life-world as a
correlation of our ultimate subjectivity makes clearer why the “naïve faith”
in the world as preserving whatever projects we are not currently engaged
in is not immediately a misguided optimism. The life-world is just the flesh
in which our human flesh is free to submerge itself (as our memory deposits
itself in concrete objects) in order to return, when we switch directions, to
another position that continues to matter to us.
Just as we are unities of kinaestheses responding to things and just as
things are unities of adumbrations responding to us, so too the whole of our
constituting life responds to this life of the world and this world responds to
us. Ultimately, then, the life-world is entwined with the life of the transcen-
dental ego. It, the life-world, is not deduced as the a priori flesh of the tran-
scendental ego; rather, it appears, it is immediately experienced, as the very
necessity, the field and reference of subjectivity. The life-world demands, as
it were, that subjectivity recognize itself within its layers.
The Life-World as the Very Life of Intersubjectivity 
Having suggested how the life-world demands its organic agency be recog-
nized as the transcendental ego’s own flesh, I will now go on to talk more
specifically about the particular ways in which the life-world comes to be
recognized in this way. In particular, I will show how the life-world reveals
itself within one’s own bodily experience of intercorporeality or intersub-
jectivity. 
First, however, I will restate with Husserl what the life-world is not.
The life-world is not simply the lebendigen Horizonthaftigkeit of our par-
ticular acts in the natural attitude (Krisis 152). It is more than this horizon
that makes possible the life of the subject as having particular objects and
vocations. The life-world is more than “a single indivisible, interrelated
complex of life [Lebenszusammenhang]” (Crisis 149; Krisis 152).
These remarks about what the life-world is not make sense, life in the
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natural attitude makes sense, our ability to change from one vocation to an-
other makes sense, only if the experience of the life of the life-world is much
more than a simple attachment of the word “living” to rather abstract ideas
like “horizon” or “complex.” The life-world is not alive from without; it is
an organism, which the transcendental ego lives as its own from within.
However, given the transcendental epoche, the life of the life-world is also
not necessarily anything like the idea of life in the sense of the natural sci-
ences. The transcendental notion of life and the notion of the transcendental
ego’s body both precede the natural-scientific concepts and ground them. 
Husserl begins to describe the notion of life that the life-world is when
he says that “our exclusive task shall be to comprehend precisely this style
[Stil], precisely this whole merely subjective and apparently incomprehen-
sible ‘Heraclitean flux’” (Crisis 156; Krisis 159). A style, a flux - a flow that
is not random but one that would “push us on to inquire into new correla-
tions inseparably bound up with those already displayed” (Crisis 159) - this
is the beginning of the description. But the life-world’s agency is more than
an external force that moves us from experience to experience as singular
subjects. The life-world lives as the very sustenance of our mutual inter-
penetration. Its internal agency displays itself as the internal links between
subjects.
The life-world is alive insofar as it makes us aware that what we per-
ceive is already perceived by others. The experience of this life-world’s own
life, then, is the experience of an internally regulated flow and style that
compel us towards one another as co-subjects, the flow and style that make
things elide any one person’s full grasp. The life of the life-world is the life
that allows a thing to appear but at the same time to remain a thing “which
no one experiences as really seen, since it is always in motion” (164). We
become aware of the life-world as having an internal determination, as be-
ing itself alive, through the way in which it compels us to see our own in-
ternal determinations, our own extensions into the lives of one another. 
The life-world’s life is experienced as the life that sustains the phe-
nomena that occur between ourselves, the life of the “between” that most of
the time gets immediately and concretely constituted as the “separate” life
of intimate relationships, families, and societies. Each experience of a rela-
tionship appears to us as having a “life of its own.” Each relationship ap-
pears as having a kind of agency that we belong to, that we help to flesh out,
but that we do not singularly or perhaps even together necessarily control.
We experience the life-world as that which is responsible for these separate
lives of our interpenetration, responsible for their very appearance, for the
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larger notion of their “higher level personality” or life. The life-world is
alive in the sense that it “organizes” us, compels us towards, sustains or
challenges our relationships with others. This is why the life of the life-
world is not given adequately to us in the natural attitude; the life is only
viewable from the standpoint of the whole of the transcendental ego, the one
that is already intersubjective. 
Agency, flow, style, internally-regulated organism - these are the words
that can be used to describe the life-world. These characteristics re-appear
in particular ways in the experience of things and of one’s own lived body.
My own body and any other experienced thing each appears, each in its own
way, as “an index of its systematic multiplicities” and “a harmonious flow
of manners of givenness” only because I recognize the world as the flow of
flows, the index of indices, only because I am fundamentally a transcen-
dental ego that recognizes itself as a correlation between subject and world,
between subject and other (166). 
The life of the life-world that is also my own as transcendental ego is
never simply that of an organism plugged into its environment, an environ-
ment on which and in which it equally thrives and suffers. Rather, the life of
the life-world is that of an organism that is its environment, that is at once
both the condition for the possibility of that environment and the direct pro-
duction of it. Only such an experience of life could then be separated into
two terms, organism and environment, that stood to face one another. Only
such an experience of life could be separated into different subjects, into
subjects and objects, with the subject discovering just how demanding oth-
er subjects and objects can be.
The life of the life-world is intersubjective; it is a life in which “all the
levels and strata through which the syntheses, intentionally overlapping
[übergreifende] as they are from subject to subject, are interwoven [ver-
flochten] [and] form a universal unity of synthesis” (Crisis 168; Krisis 170).
The life of the life-world is a reaching-over, an inter-weaving. It produces
the very possibility of this lived body here to overlay other bodies, other
things and to identify them. The life of the life-world is at once the life of
all of us, the life of intersubjectivity, and also the life that is accessible only
when we see that we form, together, a kind of universal subjectivity, a sub-
jectivity that we own (much as we own our family, our university, our coun-
try) only by also being produced by it as its particular layers.
The life-world has its own time, just as each of us lives through our
sickness or health in a particular way. The life-world also has its own space:
“the world is a spatiotemporal world; spatiotemporality (as ‘living [leben-
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dige]’ not as logicomathematical) belongs to its own ontic meaning as life-
world” (Crisis 168; Krisis 171). The life-world lives its own time and space.
And it does so as the universal subjectivity that is interwoven in and corre-
lated with it. 
Only if I live, on the one hand, as a human within and on the organism
of the life-world, only if I, on the other hand, also am the whole transcen-
dental subjectivity that is its world as its own flesh does it make sense how
my own experience of my anxiety appears as conflicting with the experience
of the “objective” space and time of a flight from Chicago to Italy. The rela-
tionship between my experiences of objective time and of my own personal
lived time indicates the relationship between my own lived time and that of
the life-world. My own lived time (this personal anxiety) as this person here
and now in the plane is made possible by an experience of time that embraces
all human relationships, that is lived on behalf of all consciousness, even the
“objective” one. My ability to experience the fact, even within the throes of
my anxiety, that she lives this flight differently than I do - she can sleep! - is
possible only if an experience of time on behalf of the whole of intersubjec-
tivity is possible and given. The transcendental ego lives the time of the en-
tire life-world as its own. Hence, I can make changes in my own lived time,
can work through my anxiety, can let her ability to sleep calm me.
Only if the life-world is an original organism, does it also make sense
that I have a lived experience of space that conflicts with the objective one.
My own body sustains ever-new experiences of its own synthetic unity (this
toe hurts because I have walked too far for the past two days) and of its re-
lations to others (physical proximity and intimacy with a spouse is never
simple and never finishes being described and delimited even if the size of
the apartment never changes). This ever-new experience of lived space - the
experience of the airplane as not a number of square meters but as a prison
or a bedroom - is possible only if my experience of my lived space appears
as conflicting with my experience of objective space and of the lived space
of others. But again this experience of conflict presupposes an experience of
space that is the unity of these separate spaces. We, as the transcendental
ego, do not simply have space or time as a “program” in our ego; rather, we
live it as an experience that embraces all modes of space. We live the space
and time of the life-world.
As an internally regulated organism, as a separate experience of time
and space, the life-world sustains and then takes up our experiences into it-
self. In a sense it is the perfect organism in that it feeds on what it has yield-
ed. Indeed this transcendental life, this life-world only feeds and expands or
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changes according to self-defined limits: “But however it changes and how-
ever it may be corrected, it holds to its essentially lawful set of types, to
which all life and thus all science, to which it is the ‘ground,’ remain bound.
Thus it also has an ontology to be derived from pure self-evidence” (Crisis
173). As the ego’s flesh, the life-world is not without limits. And yet the ego
must still discover those limits as if for the first time. 
Although the life-world is experienced as an organism, although it has
an ontology of its own, still the life-world only appears as such because it is
limited by the transcendental ego’s original activity; only as delimited by the
transcendental ego as its correlate can the life-world be experienced as itself
alive. The life of the life-world is therefore not that of a foreign organism; it
is that of a unity of ourselves, our deepest functioning “yes” to the entirety of
experience insofar as it can appear as our own lives. Any difference the life-
world presents, then, is a kind of self-alienation; one that is addressed by our
coming back to experience it. Hence, the life-world is an organism that ap-
pears on the one hand as one’s own (transcendental) life and yet appears qua
oneself as this person as a separate, ongoing experience.
Ultimately, I claim that the body of the transcendental ego just is the
life-world. Its flesh is just as surely its syntheses and correlations, its flow
and style, as Archie Bunker’s body extends to the chair in which he habitu-
ally sits (as evidenced in the uncomfortable glances Edith and Gloria give
to Mike when he sits in it). However, this argument needs to be further de-
veloped by showing both how one moves from the lived body to the life-
world and how one moves back from the life-world to the body.
Leib and Lebenswelt
In Crisis, Husserl describes how the relation of psychology and transcen-
dental phenomenology, and thus the relation between the natural-attitude
person or psyche and the transcendental ego, is one “of the alliance of dif-
ference and identity” (205). That relationship, the alliance of difference and
identity, is exactly what one could use to describe the relation between or-
gans and systems in the body, between an organism and its environment, be-
tween persons in an intimate relationship. And indeed, Husserl makes it
clear that any activity the transcendental ego can perform, such as looking
from above at the life-world as a living whole, must be located again “in a
psychological internal analysis”; in other words, the transcendental ego’s
acts and insights “would be apperceived as something belonging to the real
soul as related in reality to the real living body” (206). 
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The transcendental ego and its intertwining with the life-world must
reappear as the relation between soul and body. It is in this sense then that
the transcendental ego has its flesh, is related to its flesh. Not simply, not
just as I am living out my own body here and now in the natural attitude, in
the writing of the paper. But in such a way as to constitute the entirety of
what appears as in a sense my own, as close to me as my body is. That the
transcendental ego and its insights would have to be an appearance in my
own soul-body relationship must mean that the transcendental ego is not for-
eign to flesh, is not a mythical logos that has nothing to do with what it en-
counters. Rather, there is a notion of flesh, an experience of it, that the tran-
scendental ego has that is translated into embodiment: “everything that has
newly flowed in is now concretely localized in the world through the living
body, which is essentially always constituted along with it” (210). The
world and my body, Archie and his chair - these co-constituted unities of ex-
perience are only possible together because the transcendental ego has its
transcendental flesh already within it. But what’s more, the insight I have in-
to the life-world now gets translated into a new, developing kind of lived
bodily life.
This new, developing bodily life is in part the process of memory, of be-
ing able to return to the things in the world and to re-view, re-invest, re-
claim them as my own. John Russon in his excellent book Human Experi-
ence: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life has argued
how memory is really the way we have deposited ourselves into things:
“Our memory, most fundamentally, is what we experience as the determi-
nateness of objects that communicates to us what we can and cannot do. Our
objects, rather than our brain cells, are the ‘files’ that retain our past” (41).
For Russon, truth moves through the things that are attached to us. Our
body’s sense of location, its historicity, its future, is mapped out in its intri-
cate threads that bind it to things, other people, and situations.
What Husserl would offer as an addition to Russon’s claim is that par-
ticular objects could appear to us as the sedimentations of our particular ex-
periences only if the entirety of our memory, our historicity as such, were al-
ready experienced as a function of the total flesh of the life-world. Memory
is not “most fundamentally” an experience of standing aloof from the world
in order to remain locked within oneself. Rather, memory is acknowledging
the world as one’s self, as sustaining the very connections between, for ex-
ample, the present picture of a lyre and the thought of one’s absent friend
that follows in an instant. The life-world is the network of paths we have
carved out from object to object in response to their claims to similarity or
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difference. And we have left those paths there where we found them, name-
ly in objects, since it has become clear to us that the world is close enough
to us that it will continue to carry us forth from one object to another. 
As Russon notes, if the objects wear down, and the picture fades, and
the neighborhood changes, the memories are gone (41). In such an experi-
ence of loss, we have made explicit the fact that we have always already at-
tributed the force of our memory to the world, that we have implicitly a-
greed that our subjectivity is not simply inside this body but is in all that we
grasp. Such a life-world is not simply an indifferent container or sum. It is
the very life by which memory works its way, its organizational features that
make particular associations possible. 
Specific relations, cultures, societies - these and the projects and in-
sights that are part of them - are alive and relevant to transcendental subjec-
tivity only insofar as that transcendental ego is immediately a memorial
flesh, insofar as the transcendental subject can deposit its significances in all
of its bodily extremities (that is into all objects and other persons) and move
back and forth among them. However, this transcendental ego, in order to
remember itself in its deposits, must also give over its process of memory to
these objects and these others. Its flesh must be a dispersed flesh, a Diaspo-
ra. Its flesh, its memory, must be multiple and intersubjective - its memory
must be performed by the things and the others who call it (the transcen-
dental ego) to respond.
Only then, in confronting itself with itself in the pairing with other per-
sons (who also remember these relations, cultures, and societies) can the
transcendental ego pass through its body and its things to responsible truth.
Only in always already co-extending itself into the lives of the others who
share a body (in sharing a family, a society, a humanity) can the transcen-
dental ego return and grasp as if for the first time the new insights that it has
given to itself as the space of life-world and the time of life-time. 
To speak as Russon and Husserl do of the mutual internality of all
subjects in transcendental intersubjectivity is to speak of an experience of
an organicity that is not a totalitarian state. To speak of the life-world is
not to speak of an organism by which the transcendental ego objectifies
and memorializes itself as individuals that are merely to be its organs. For
memory, like medicine and indeed every act that the life-world guides and
sustains, is impossible without the very real gaps and separations, the
spaces that constitute the possibility and necessity of coming back, of rein-
terpretation, synthesis, and continuity. When the transcendental ego lives
its life-world (when it constitutes itself as the very method and possibility
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of depositing itself into objects, relations, and world), it is far from total-
izing. Instead, when it lives its life-world, the transcendental ego takes
risks.
By being the subjectivity that makes deposits, that sediments, the tran-
scendental ego can claim no special status to the relation between itself and
its life-world: “In the concreteness of transcendental intersubjectivity, in the
universal interconnection of life, the pole, or rather the system of poles
which is called the world, is contained as an intentional object in exactly the
same way that any intention contains its intentional object” (Husserl, Crisis
262, my emphasis). Just as a body can be wounded or become ill, the situa-
tion as such of the ego and the life-world can unravel. It may be that the
traces that the transcendental ego has crafted in its historical Diaspora will
be lost and their re-enactment impossible. 
No, the claim that the flesh of the transcendental ego, the life-world, is
our flesh is more the announcement of a task than of an established truth.
The life-world is not our flesh in the sense of an abstract essence of the nor-
mal, human form; not our flesh as simply this particular human body or that
one. But the transcendental ego’s flesh, the life-world, is just the way that I
can remember or be “in” the music, be “towards” my death, be “bothered”
by others’ bad driving. The transcendental flesh of the life-world is the very
possibility of being a body. 
The life of the body within the life-world, though sketched out in ad-
vance, is never given beforehand in its concrete details. Rather, a body, the
one that this flesh makes possible, is the object that reaches beyond itself in
new ways towards other objects, those that have already begun to matter, to
call, to be interpreted, to be incorporated. The body then offers something to
the life-world, offers new explications that the life-world takes over as if al-
ways already a part of it, and the body therefore allows this most original of
things, the life-world, to continue to secrete layers of bodily life for me and
for others. 
In conclusion, it is because the whole life-world has, from the begin-
ning, been united with (my) transcendental ego as its flesh, that I can move
on from this paper, can remember or forget it, can deposit its sense for the
sake of others. In moving on, the life-world is enriched, and preserves, as if
in unconscious traces and possibilities for further analysis, the layers of
meaning that bodily experience offers it. 
Providence College
United States of America
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